fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets (API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data, and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials. - server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET); switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the CJS module binding live for all importers without restart - apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET - admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret, persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry - Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately - docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml, secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ services:
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- NODE_ENV=production
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- PORT=3000
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- JWT_SECRET=${JWT_SECRET:-} # Auto-generated if not set; persist across restarts for stable sessions
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- ENCRYPTION_KEY=${ENCRYPTION_KEY:-} # Auto-generated if not set. If upgrading, set to your old JWT_SECRET value to keep existing encrypted secrets readable.
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- TZ=${TZ:-UTC} # Timezone for logs, reminders and scheduled tasks (e.g. Europe/Berlin)
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- LOG_LEVEL=${LOG_LEVEL:-info} # info = concise user actions; debug = verbose admin-level details
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- ALLOWED_ORIGINS=${ALLOWED_ORIGINS:-} # Comma-separated origins for CORS and email notification links
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