fix: decouple at-rest encryption from JWT_SECRET, add JWT rotation
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets (API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data, and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials. - server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET); switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the CJS module binding live for all importers without restart - apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET - admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret, persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry - Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately - docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml, secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
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@@ -2,19 +2,19 @@ import crypto from 'crypto';
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import fs from 'fs';
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import path from 'path';
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let JWT_SECRET: string = process.env.JWT_SECRET || '';
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let _jwtSecret: string = process.env.JWT_SECRET || '';
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if (!JWT_SECRET) {
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if (!_jwtSecret) {
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const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../data');
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const secretFile = path.join(dataDir, '.jwt_secret');
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try {
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JWT_SECRET = fs.readFileSync(secretFile, 'utf8').trim();
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_jwtSecret = fs.readFileSync(secretFile, 'utf8').trim();
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} catch {
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JWT_SECRET = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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_jwtSecret = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(secretFile, JWT_SECRET, { mode: 0o600 });
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fs.writeFileSync(secretFile, _jwtSecret, { mode: 0o600 });
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console.log('Generated and saved JWT secret to', secretFile);
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} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
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console.warn('WARNING: Could not persist JWT secret to disk:', writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr);
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@@ -25,4 +25,45 @@ if (!JWT_SECRET) {
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const JWT_SECRET_IS_GENERATED = !process.env.JWT_SECRET;
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export { JWT_SECRET, JWT_SECRET_IS_GENERATED };
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// export let so TypeScript's CJS output keeps exports.JWT_SECRET live
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// (generates `exports.JWT_SECRET = JWT_SECRET = newVal` inside updateJwtSecret)
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export let JWT_SECRET = _jwtSecret;
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// Called by the admin rotate-jwt-secret endpoint to update the in-process
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// binding that all middleware and route files reference.
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export function updateJwtSecret(newSecret: string): void {
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JWT_SECRET = newSecret;
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}
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// ENCRYPTION_KEY is used to derive at-rest encryption keys for stored secrets
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// (API keys, MFA TOTP secrets, SMTP password, OIDC client secret, etc.).
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// Keeping it separate from JWT_SECRET means you can rotate session tokens without
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// invalidating all stored encrypted data, and vice-versa.
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//
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// Upgrade note: if you already have encrypted data stored under a previous build
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// that used JWT_SECRET for encryption, set ENCRYPTION_KEY to the value of your
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// old JWT_SECRET so existing encrypted values continue to decrypt correctly.
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// After re-saving all credentials via the admin panel you can switch to a new
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// random ENCRYPTION_KEY.
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let ENCRYPTION_KEY: string = process.env.ENCRYPTION_KEY || '';
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if (!ENCRYPTION_KEY) {
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const dataDir = path.resolve(__dirname, '../data');
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const keyFile = path.join(dataDir, '.encryption_key');
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try {
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ENCRYPTION_KEY = fs.readFileSync(keyFile, 'utf8').trim();
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} catch {
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ENCRYPTION_KEY = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
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try {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dataDir)) fs.mkdirSync(dataDir, { recursive: true });
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fs.writeFileSync(keyFile, ENCRYPTION_KEY, { mode: 0o600 });
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console.log('Generated and saved encryption key to', keyFile);
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} catch (writeErr: unknown) {
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console.warn('WARNING: Could not persist encryption key to disk:', writeErr instanceof Error ? writeErr.message : writeErr);
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console.warn('Encrypted secrets will be unreadable after restart. Set ENCRYPTION_KEY env var for persistent encryption.');
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}
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}
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}
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export { JWT_SECRET_IS_GENERATED, ENCRYPTION_KEY };
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