Encrypted webhook URLs are no longer returned to the frontend. Both user
and admin webhook fields now show '••••••••' as a placeholder when a URL
is already saved, and the sentinel value is skipped on save/test so the
stored secret is never exposed or accidentally overwritten.
- SSRF: guard sendWebhook() with checkSsrf() + createPinnedAgent() to block
requests to loopback, link-local, private network, and cloud metadata endpoints
- XSS: escape subject, body, and ctaHref in buildEmailHtml() via escapeHtml()
to prevent HTML injection through user-controlled params (actor, preview, etc.)
- Encrypt webhook URLs at rest: apply maybe_encrypt_api_key on save
(settingsService for user URLs, authService for admin URL) and decrypt_api_key
on read in getUserWebhookUrl() / getAdminWebhookUrl()
- Log failed channel dispatches: inspect Promise.allSettled() results and log
rejections via logError instead of silently dropping them
- Log admin webhook failures: replace fire-and-forget .catch(() => {}) with
.catch(err => logError(...)) and await the call
- Migration 69: guard against missing notification_preferences table on fresh installs
- Migration 70: drop the now-unused notification_preferences table
- Refactor: extract applyUserChannelPrefs() helper to deduplicate
setPreferences / setAdminPreferences logic
- Tests: add SEC-016 (XSS, 5 cases) and SEC-017 (SSRF, 6 cases) test suites;
mock ssrfGuard in notificationService tests
