- LoginPage now uses getApiErrorMessage() instead of err.message so
backend validation errors (e.g. "Password must be at least 8 characters")
are displayed instead of the generic "Request failed with status code 400"
- Add missing db import in server/src/index.ts
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
security: require auth for uploaded photos (GHSA-wxx3-84fc-mrx2)
GHSA-pcr3-6647-jh72 (HIGH):
- Add canAccessTrip check to all /trips/:tripId/photos and
/trips/:tripId/album-links endpoints
- Prevents authenticated users from accessing other trips' photos
GHSA-wxx3-84fc-mrx2 (LOW):
- /uploads/photos now requires JWT auth token or valid share token
- Covers and avatars remain public (needed for login/share pages)
- Files were already blocked behind auth
Map markers:
- Collapsing a day in the sidebar hides its places from the map
- Places assigned to multiple days only hide when all days collapsed
- Unplanned places always stay visible
Immich settings:
- New POST /integrations/immich/test endpoint validates credentials
without saving them
- Save button disabled until test connection passes
- Changing URL or API key resets test status
- i18n: testFirst key for all 12 languages
- Link Immich albums to trips — photos sync automatically
- Album picker shows all user's Immich albums
- Linked albums displayed as chips with sync/unlink buttons
- Auto-sync on link: fetches all album photos and adds to trip
- Manual re-sync button for each linked album
- DB migration: trip_album_links table
fix: shared Immich photos visible to other trip members
- Thumbnail/original proxy now uses photo owner's Immich credentials
when userId query param is provided, fixing 404 for shared photos
- i18n: album keys for all 12 languages
Store & re-render optimization:
- TripPlannerPage uses selective Zustand selectors instead of full store
- placesSlice only updates affected days on place update/delete
- Route calculation only reacts to selected day's assignments
- DayPlanSidebar uses stable action refs instead of full store
Map marker performance:
- Shared photoService for PlaceAvatar and MapView (single cache, no duplicate requests)
- Client-side base64 thumbnail generation via canvas (CORS-safe for Wikimedia)
- Map markers use base64 data URL <img> tags for smooth zoom (no external image decode)
- Sidebar uses same base64 thumbnails with IntersectionObserver for visible-first loading
- Icon cache prevents duplicate L.divIcon creation
- MarkerClusterGroup with animate:false and optimized chunk settings
- Photo fetch deduplication and batched state updates
Server optimizations:
- Wikimedia image size reduced to 400px (from 600px)
- Photo cache: 5min TTL for errors (was 12h), prevents stale 404 caching
- Removed unused image-proxy endpoint
UX improvements:
- Splash screen with plane animation during initial photo preload
- Markdown rendering in DayPlanSidebar place descriptions
- Missing i18n keys added, all 12 languages synced to 1376 keys
- New expense_date column on budget items (DB migration #42)
- Date column in budget table with custom date picker
- CSV export button with BOM, semicolon separator, localized dates,
currency in header, per-person/day calculations
- CustomDatePicker compact/borderless modes for inline table use
- i18n keys for all 12 languages
Eliminates XSS token theft risk by storing session JWTs in an httpOnly
cookie (trek_session) instead of localStorage, making them inaccessible
to JavaScript entirely.
- Add cookie-parser middleware and setAuthCookie/clearAuthCookie helpers
- Set trek_session cookie on login, register, demo-login, MFA verify, OIDC exchange
- Auth middleware reads cookie first, falls back to Authorization: Bearer (MCP unchanged)
- Add POST /api/auth/logout to clear the cookie server-side
- Remove all localStorage auth_token reads/writes from client
- Axios uses withCredentials; raw fetch calls use credentials: include
- WebSocket ws-token exchange uses credentials: include (no JWT param)
- authStore initialises isLoading: true so ProtectedRoute waits for /api/auth/me
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Import places from shared Google Maps lists via URL.
Button in places sidebar next to GPX import opens a modal
where users can paste a shared list link. Server fetches
list data from Google Maps and creates places with name,
coordinates and notes. i18n keys added for all 12 languages.
Closes#205
Previously, when the JWT secret was used as a fallback encryption key,
nothing was written to data/.encryption_key. This meant that rotating
the JWT secret via the admin panel would silently break decryption of
all stored secrets on the next restart.
Now, whatever key is resolved — env var, JWT secret fallback, or
auto-generated — is immediately persisted to data/.encryption_key.
On all subsequent starts, the file is read directly and the fallback
chain is skipped entirely, making JWT rotation permanently safe.
The env var path also writes to the file so the key survives container
restarts if the env var is later removed.
process.exit(1) when ENCRYPTION_KEY is unset was a breaking change for
existing installs — a plain git pull would prevent the server from
starting.
Replace with a three-step fallback:
1. ENCRYPTION_KEY env var (explicit, takes priority)
2. data/.jwt_secret (existing installs: encrypted data stays readable
after upgrade with zero manual intervention)
3. data/.encryption_key auto-generated on first start (fresh installs)
A warning is logged when falling back to the JWT secret so operators
are nudged toward setting ENCRYPTION_KEY explicitly.
Update README env table and Docker Compose comment to reflect that
ENCRYPTION_KEY is recommended but no longer required.
The startup error now tells operators exactly where to find the old key
value (./data/.jwt_secret) rather than just saying "your old JWT_SECRET".
docker-compose.yml and README updated to mark ENCRYPTION_KEY as required
and remove the stale "auto-generated" comments.
Auto-generating and persisting the key to data/.encryption_key co-locates
the key with the database, defeating encryption at rest if an attacker can
read the data directory. It also silently loses all encrypted secrets if the
data volume is recreated.
Replace the auto-generation fallback with a hard startup error that tells
operators exactly what to do:
- Upgraders from the JWT_SECRET-derived encryption era: set ENCRYPTION_KEY
to their old JWT_SECRET so existing ciphertext remains readable.
- Fresh installs: generate a key with `openssl rand -hex 32`.
- Create server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts with checkSsrf() and createPinnedAgent()
- Resolves DNS before allowing outbound requests to catch hostnames that
map to private IPs (closes the TOCTOU gap in the old inline checks)
- Always blocks loopback (127.x, ::1) and link-local/metadata (169.254.x)
- RFC-1918, CGNAT (100.64/10), and IPv6 ULA ranges blocked by default;
opt-in via ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK=true for self-hosters running Immich
on a local network
- createPinnedAgent() pins node-fetch to the validated IP, preventing
DNS rebinding between the check and the actual connection
- Replace isValidImmichUrl() (hostname-string check, no DNS resolution)
with checkSsrf(); make PUT /integrations/immich/settings async
- Audit log entry (immich.private_ip_configured) written when a user
saves an Immich URL that resolves to a private IP
- Response includes a warning field surfaced as a toast in the UI
- Replace ~20 lines of duplicated inline SSRF logic in the link-preview
handler with a single checkSsrf() call + pinned agent
- Document ALLOW_INTERNAL_NETWORK in README, docker-compose.yml,
server/.env.example, chart/values.yaml, chart/templates/configmap.yaml,
and chart/README.md
Replace duplicated inline validation with a shared validatePassword()
utility that checks minimum length (8), rejects repetitive and common
passwords, and requires uppercase, lowercase, a digit, and a special
character.
- Add server/src/services/passwordPolicy.ts as single source of truth
- Apply to registration, password change, and admin create/edit user
(admin routes previously had zero validation)
- Fix client min-length mismatch (6 vs 8) in RegisterPage and LoginPage
- Add client-side password length guard to AdminPage forms
- Update register.passwordTooShort and settings.passwordWeak i18n keys
in all 12 locales to reflect the corrected requirements
TOTP brute-force is a realistic attack once a password is compromised:
with no independent throttle, an attacker shared the login budget (10
attempts) across /login, /register, and /mfa/verify-login, and
/mfa/enable had no rate limiting at all.
- Add a dedicated `mfaAttempts` store so MFA limits are tracked
separately from login attempts
- Introduce `mfaLimiter` (5 attempts / 15 min) applied to both
/mfa/verify-login and /mfa/enable
- Refactor `rateLimiter()` to accept an optional store parameter,
keeping all existing call-sites unchanged
- Include mfaAttempts in the periodic cleanup interval
Three vulnerabilities patched in the /export.ics route:
- esc() now handles bare \r and CRLF sequences — the previous regex only
matched \n, leaving \r intact and allowing CRLF injection via \r\n
- reservation DESCRIPTION field was built from unescaped user data
(type, confirmation_number, notes, airline, flight/train numbers,
airports) and written raw into ICS output; now passed through esc()
- Content-Disposition filename used ICS escaping instead of HTTP header
sanitization; replaced with a character allowlist to prevent " and
\r\n injection into the response header
Setting JWT_SECRET via environment variable was broken by design:
the admin panel rotation updates the in-memory binding and persists
the new value to data/.jwt_secret, but an env var would silently
override it on the next restart, reverting the rotation.
The server now always loads JWT_SECRET from data/.jwt_secret
(auto-generating it on first start), making the file the single
source of truth. Rotation is handled exclusively through the admin
panel.
- config.ts: drop process.env.JWT_SECRET fallback and
JWT_SECRET_IS_GENERATED export; always read from / write to
data/.jwt_secret
- index.ts: remove the now-obsolete JWT_SECRET startup warning
- .env.example, docker-compose.yml, README: remove JWT_SECRET entries
- Helm chart: remove JWT_SECRET from secretEnv, secret.yaml, and
deployment.yaml; rename generateJwtSecret → generateEncryptionKey
and update NOTES.txt and README accordingly
Introduces a dedicated ENCRYPTION_KEY for encrypting stored secrets
(API keys, MFA TOTP, SMTP password, OIDC client secret) so that
rotating the JWT signing secret no longer invalidates encrypted data,
and a compromised JWT_SECRET no longer exposes stored credentials.
- server/src/config.ts: add ENCRYPTION_KEY (auto-generated to
data/.encryption_key if not set, same pattern as JWT_SECRET);
switch JWT_SECRET to `export let` so updateJwtSecret() keeps the
CJS module binding live for all importers without restart
- apiKeyCrypto.ts, mfaCrypto.ts: derive encryption keys from
ENCRYPTION_KEY instead of JWT_SECRET
- admin POST /rotate-jwt-secret: generates a new 32-byte hex secret,
persists it to data/.jwt_secret, updates the live in-process binding
via updateJwtSecret(), and writes an audit log entry
- Admin panel (Settings → Danger Zone): "Rotate JWT Secret" button
with a confirmation modal warning that all sessions will be
invalidated; on success the acting admin is logged out immediately
- docker-compose.yml, .env.example, README, Helm chart (values.yaml,
secret.yaml, deployment.yaml, NOTES.txt, README): document
ENCRYPTION_KEY and its upgrade migration path
Before swapping in a restored database, run PRAGMA integrity_check and
verify the five core TREK tables (users, trips, trip_members, places,
days) are present. This blocks restoring corrupt, empty, or unrelated
SQLite files that would otherwise crash the app immediately after swap,
and prevents a malicious admin from hot-swapping a crafted database with
forged users or permissions.
Per-user Immich API keys were stored as plaintext in the users table,
giving any attacker with DB read access full control over each user's
Immich photo server. Keys are now encrypted on write with
maybe_encrypt_api_key() and decrypted at the point of use via a shared
getImmichCredentials() helper. A new migration (index 66) back-fills
encryption for any existing plaintext values on startup.
Addresses CWE-598: long-lived JWTs were exposed in WebSocket URLs, file
download links, and Immich asset proxy URLs, leaking into server logs,
browser history, and Referer headers.
- Add ephemeralTokens service: in-memory single-use tokens with per-purpose
TTLs (ws=30s, download/immich=60s), max 10k entries, periodic cleanup
- Add POST /api/auth/ws-token and POST /api/auth/resource-token endpoints
- WebSocket auth now consumes an ephemeral token instead of verifying the JWT
directly from the URL; client fetches a fresh token before each connect
- File download ?token= query param now accepts ephemeral tokens; Bearer
header path continues to accept JWTs for programmatic access
- Immich asset proxy replaces authFromQuery JWT injection with ephemeral token
consumption
- Client: new getAuthUrl() utility, AuthedImg/ImmichImg components, and async
onClick handlers replace the synchronous authUrl() pattern throughout
FileManager, PlaceInspector, and MemoriesPanel
- Add OIDC_DISCOVERY_URL env var and oidc_discovery_url DB setting to allow
overriding the auto-constructed discovery endpoint (required for Authentik
and similar providers); exposed in the admin UI and .env.example
The OIDC login route silently fell back to building the redirect URI from
X-Forwarded-Host/X-Forwarded-Proto when APP_URL was not configured. An
attacker could set X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.example.com to redirect the
authorization code to their own server after the user authenticates.
Remove the header-derived fallback entirely. If APP_URL is not set (via env
or the app_url DB setting), the OIDC login endpoint now returns a 500 error
rather than trusting attacker-controlled request headers. Document APP_URL
in .env.example as required for OIDC use.
The smtp_pass setting was stored as plaintext in app_settings, exposing
SMTP credentials to anyone with database read access. Apply the same
encrypt_api_key/decrypt_api_key pattern already used for OIDC client
secrets and API keys. A new migration transparently re-encrypts any
existing plaintext value on startup; decrypt_api_key handles legacy
plaintext gracefully so in-flight reads remain safe during upgrade.
The oidc_client_secret was written to app_settings as plaintext,
unlike Maps and OpenWeather API keys which are protected with
apiKeyCrypto. An attacker with read access to the SQLite file
(e.g. via a backup download) could obtain the secret and
impersonate the application with the identity provider.
- Encrypt on write in PUT /api/admin/oidc via maybe_encrypt_api_key
- Decrypt on read in GET /api/admin/oidc and in getOidcConfig()
(oidc.ts) before passing the secret to the OIDC client library
- Add a startup migration that encrypts any existing plaintext value
already present in the database
getPlaceWithTags, canAccessTrip, and isOwner were calling _db! directly,
bypassing the Proxy that guards against null-dereference during a backup
restore. When the restore handler briefly sets _db = null, any concurrent
request hitting these helpers would crash with an unhandled TypeError
instead of receiving a clean 503-style error.
Replace all four _db! accesses with the exported db proxy so the guard
("Database connection is not available") fires consistently.
Previously, the migration runner called each migration function directly with no transaction wrapping and updated schema_version only after all pending migrations had run. A mid-migration failure (e.g. disk full after ALTER TABLE but before CREATE INDEX) would leave the schema in a partially-applied state with no rollback path. On the next restart the broken migration would be skipped — because schema_version had not advanced — but only if the failure was noticed at all.
~43 catch {} blocks silently discarded every error, including non-idempotency errors such as disk-full or corruption, making it impossible to know a migration had failed.
Changes:
- Each migration now runs inside db.transaction(); better-sqlite3 rolls back automatically on throw.
- schema_version is updated after every individual migration succeeds, so a failure does not cause already-applied migrations to re-run.
- A migration that throws after rollback logs FATAL and calls process.exit(1), refusing to start with a broken schema.
- All catch {} blocks on ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN re-throw any error that is not "duplicate column name", so only the expected idempotency case is swallowed.
- Genuinely optional steps (INSERT OR IGNORE, UPDATE data-copy, DROP TABLE IF EXISTS) now log a warning instead of discarding the error entirely.
The POST /api/admin/update endpoint ran git pull, npm install, and npm run build via execSync, potentially giving any compromised admin account full code execution on the host in case repository is compromised. TREK ships as a Docker image so runtime self-updating is unnecessary.
- Remove the /update route and child_process import from admin.ts
- Remove the installUpdate API client method
- Replace the live-update modal with an info-only panel showing docker pull instructions and a link to the GitHub release
- Drop the updating/updateResult state and handleInstallUpdate handler
Adds a full permissions management feature allowing admins to control
who can perform actions across the app (trip CRUD, files, places,
budget, packing, reservations, collab, members, share links).
- New server/src/services/permissions.ts: 16 configurable actions,
in-memory cache, checkPermission() helper, backwards-compatible
defaults matching upstream behaviour
- GET/PUT /admin/permissions endpoints; permissions loaded into
app-config response so clients have them on startup
- checkPermission() applied to all mutating route handlers across
10 server route files; getTripOwnerId() helper eliminates repeated
inline DB queries; trips.ts and files.ts now reuse canAccessTrip()
result to avoid redundant DB round-trips
- New client/src/store/permissionsStore.ts: Zustand store +
useCanDo() hook; TripOwnerContext type accepts both Trip and
DashboardTrip shapes without casting at call sites
- New client/src/components/Admin/PermissionsPanel.tsx: categorised
UI with per-action dropdowns, customised badge, save/reset
- AdminPage, DashboardPage, FileManager, PlacesSidebar,
TripMembersModal gated via useCanDo(); no prop drilling
- 46 perm.* translation keys added to all 12 language files
Bounding boxes overlap for neighboring countries (e.g. Munich matched
Austria instead of Germany). Now uses Nominatim reverse geocoding with
in-memory cache as primary fallback, bounding boxes only as last resort.
- Block direct access to /uploads/files (401), serve via authenticated
/api/trips/:tripId/files/:id/download with JWT verification
- Client passes auth token as query parameter for direct links
- Atlas country search now uses Intl.DisplayNames (user language) instead
of English GeoJSON names
- Atlas search results use flagcdn.com flag images instead of emoji
- Add configurable trip reminder days (1, 3, 9 or custom up to 30) settable by trip owner
- Grant administrators full access to edit, archive, delete, view and list all trips
- Show trip owner email in audit logs and docker logs when admin edits/deletes another user's trip
- Show target user email in audit logs when admin edits or deletes a user account
- Use email instead of username in all notifications (Discord/Slack/email) to avoid ambiguity
- Grey out notification event toggles when no SMTP/webhook is configured
- Grey out trip reminder selector when notifications are disabled
- Skip local admin account creation when OIDC_ONLY=true with OIDC configured
- Conditional scheduler logging: show disabled reason or active reminder count
- Log per-owner reminder creation/update in docker logs
- Demote 401/403 HTTP errors to DEBUG log level to reduce noise
- Hide edit/archive/delete buttons for non-owner invited users on trip cards
- Fix literal "0" rendering on trip cards from SQLite numeric is_owner field
- Add missing translation keys across all 14 language files
Made-with: Cursor
- Add centralized notification service with webhook (Discord/Slack) and
email (SMTP) support, triggered for trip invites, booking changes,
collab messages, and trip reminders
- Webhook sends one message per event (group channel); email sends
individually per trip member, excluding the actor
- Discord invite notifications now include the invited user's name
- Add LOG_LEVEL env var (info/debug) controlling console and file output
- INFO logs show user email, action, and IP for audit events; errors
for HTTP requests
- DEBUG logs show every request with full body/query (passwords redacted),
audit details, notification params, and webhook payloads
- Add persistent trek.log file logging with 10MB rotation (5 files)
in /app/data/logs/
- Color-coded log levels in Docker console output
- Timestamps without timezone name (user sets TZ via Docker)
- Add Test Webhook and Save buttons to admin notification settings
- Move notification event toggles to admin panel
- Add daily trip reminder scheduler (9 AM, timezone-aware)
- Wire up booking create/update/delete and collab message notifications
- Add i18n keys for notification UI across all 13 languages
Made-with: Cursor
