0ee53e7b38
The OIDC login route silently fell back to building the redirect URI from X-Forwarded-Host/X-Forwarded-Proto when APP_URL was not configured. An attacker could set X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.example.com to redirect the authorization code to their own server after the user authenticates. Remove the header-derived fallback entirely. If APP_URL is not set (via env or the app_url DB setting), the OIDC login endpoint now returns a 500 error rather than trusting attacker-controlled request headers. Document APP_URL in .env.example as required for OIDC use.
22 lines
1.3 KiB
Plaintext
22 lines
1.3 KiB
Plaintext
PORT=3001 # Port to run the server on
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NODE_ENV=development # development = development mode; production = production mode
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JWT_SECRET=your-super-secret-jwt-key-change-in-production # Auto-generated if not set; persist across restarts for stable sessions
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TZ=UTC # Timezone for logs, reminders and scheduled tasks (e.g. Europe/Berlin)
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LOG_LEVEL=info # info = concise user actions; debug = verbose admin-level details
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ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://trek.example.com # Comma-separated origins for CORS and email links
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FORCE_HTTPS=false # Redirect HTTP → HTTPS behind a TLS proxy
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TRUST_PROXY=1 # Number of trusted proxies for X-Forwarded-For
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APP_URL=https://trek.example.com # Base URL of this instance — required when OIDC is enabled; must match the redirect URI registered with your IdP
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OIDC_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com # OpenID Connect provider URL
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OIDC_CLIENT_ID=trek # OpenID Connect client ID
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OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET=supersecret # OpenID Connect client secret
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OIDC_DISPLAY_NAME=SSO # Label shown on the SSO login button
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OIDC_ONLY=true # Disable local password auth entirely (SSO only)
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OIDC_ADMIN_CLAIM=groups # OIDC claim used to identify admin users
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OIDC_ADMIN_VALUE=app-trek-admins # Value of the OIDC claim that grants admin role
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DEMO_MODE=false # Demo mode - resets data hourly
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