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fix: critical Immich SSRF and API key exposure vulnerabilities

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- Add URL validation on Immich URL save to prevent SSRF attacks
  (blocks private IPs, metadata endpoints, non-HTTP protocols)
- Remove userId query parameter from asset proxy endpoints to prevent
  any authenticated user from accessing another user's Immich API key
  and photo library
- Add asset ID validation (alphanumeric only) to prevent path traversal
  in proxied Immich API URLs
- Update AUDIT_FINDINGS.md with Immich and admin route findings

https://claude.ai/code/session_01SoQKcF5Rz9Y8Nzo4PzkxY8
This commit is contained in:
Claude
2026-03-30 23:39:42 +00:00
parent 63232e56a3
commit c89ff8b551
2 changed files with 52 additions and 9 deletions
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17
AUDIT_FINDINGS.md
View File

@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@
### Applied Fixes
- **Immich SSRF prevention** — Added URL validation on save (block private IPs, metadata endpoints, non-HTTP protocols)
- **Immich API key isolation** — Removed `userId` query parameter from asset proxy endpoints; all Immich requests now use authenticated user's own credentials only
- **Immich asset ID validation** — Added alphanumeric pattern validation to prevent path traversal in proxied URLs
- **JWT algorithm pinning** — Added `{ algorithms: ['HS256'] }` to all `jwt.verify()` calls (auth middleware, MFA policy, WebSocket, OIDC, auth routes)
- **OIDC token payload** — Reduced to `{ id }` only, matching auth.ts pattern
- **OIDC redirect URI validation** — Validates against `APP_URL` env var when set
@@ -232,6 +235,20 @@
- Major dependency upgrades (express 5, React 19, zustand 5, etc.)
- `serialize-javascript` vulnerability fix requires vite-plugin-pwa major upgrade
### 1.7 Immich Integration
| # | Severity | File | Line(s) | Description | Recommended Fix | Status |
|---|----------|------|---------|-------------|-----------------|--------|
| I-1 | **CRITICAL** | `server/src/routes/immich.ts` | 38-39, 85, 199, 250, 274 | SSRF via user-controlled `immich_url`. Users can set any URL which is then used in `fetch()` calls, allowing requests to internal metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254), localhost services, etc. | Validate URL on save: require HTTP(S) protocol, block private/internal IPs. | FIXED |
| I-2 | **CRITICAL** | `server/src/routes/immich.ts` | 194-196, 244-246, 269-270 | Asset info/thumbnail/original endpoints accept `userId` query param, allowing any authenticated user to proxy requests through another user's Immich API key. This exposes other users' Immich credentials and photo libraries. | Restrict all Immich proxy endpoints to the authenticated user's own credentials only. | FIXED |
| I-3 | **MEDIUM** | `server/src/routes/immich.ts` | 199, 250, 274 | `assetId` URL parameter used directly in `fetch()` URL construction. Path traversal characters could redirect requests to unintended Immich API endpoints. | Validate assetId matches `[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+` pattern. | FIXED |
### 1.8 Admin Routes
| # | Severity | File | Line(s) | Description | Recommended Fix | Status |
|---|----------|------|---------|-------------|-----------------|--------|
| AD-1 | **MEDIUM** | `server/src/routes/admin.ts` | 302-310 | Self-update endpoint runs `git pull` then `npm run build`. While admin-only and `npm install` uses `--ignore-scripts`, `npm run build` executes whatever is in the pulled package.json. A compromised upstream could execute arbitrary code. | Document as accepted risk for self-hosted self-update feature. Users should pin to specific versions. | DOCUMENTED |
### Additional Findings (from exhaustive scan)
- **MEDIUM** — `server/src/index.ts:121-136`: Upload files (`/uploads/:type/:filename`) served without authentication. UUIDs are unguessable but this is security-through-obscurity. **REQUIRES MANUAL REVIEW** — adding auth would break shared trip image URLs.

44
server/src/routes/immich.ts
View File

@@ -6,6 +6,29 @@ import { AuthRequest } from '../types';
const router = express.Router();
/** Validate that an asset ID is a safe UUID-like string (no path traversal). */
function isValidAssetId(id: string): boolean {
return /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(id) && id.length <= 100;
}
/** Validate that an Immich URL is a safe HTTP(S) URL (no internal/metadata IPs). */
function isValidImmichUrl(raw: string): boolean {
try {
const url = new URL(raw);
if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return false;
const hostname = url.hostname.toLowerCase();
// Block metadata endpoints and localhost
if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '127.0.0.1' || hostname === '::1') return false;
if (hostname === '169.254.169.254' || hostname === 'metadata.google.internal') return false;
// Block link-local and loopback ranges
if (hostname.startsWith('10.') || hostname.startsWith('172.') || hostname.startsWith('192.168.')) return false;
if (hostname.endsWith('.internal') || hostname.endsWith('.local')) return false;
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
// ── Immich Connection Settings ──────────────────────────────────────────────
router.get('/settings', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
@@ -20,6 +43,9 @@ router.get('/settings', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
router.put('/settings', authenticate, (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
const { immich_url, immich_api_key } = req.body;
if (immich_url && !isValidImmichUrl(immich_url.trim())) {
return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid Immich URL. Must be a valid HTTP(S) URL.' });
}
db.prepare('UPDATE users SET immich_url = ?, immich_api_key = ? WHERE id = ?').run(
immich_url?.trim() || null,
immich_api_key?.trim() || null,
@@ -189,10 +215,10 @@ router.put('/trips/:tripId/photos/:assetId/sharing', authenticate, (req: Request
router.get('/assets/:assetId/info', authenticate, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
const { assetId } = req.params;
const { userId } = req.query;
if (!isValidAssetId(assetId)) return res.status(400).json({ error: 'Invalid asset ID' });
const targetUserId = userId ? Number(userId) : authReq.user.id;
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(targetUserId) as any;
// Only allow accessing own Immich credentials — prevent leaking other users' API keys
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(authReq.user.id) as any;
if (!user?.immich_url || !user?.immich_api_key) return res.status(404).json({ error: 'Not found' });
try {
@@ -240,10 +266,10 @@ function authFromQuery(req: Request, res: Response, next: Function) {
router.get('/assets/:assetId/thumbnail', authFromQuery, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
const { assetId } = req.params;
const { userId } = req.query;
if (!isValidAssetId(assetId)) return res.status(400).send('Invalid asset ID');
const targetUserId = userId ? Number(userId) : authReq.user.id;
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(targetUserId) as any;
// Only allow accessing own Immich credentials — prevent leaking other users' API keys
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(authReq.user.id) as any;
if (!user?.immich_url || !user?.immich_api_key) return res.status(404).send('Not found');
try {
@@ -264,10 +290,10 @@ router.get('/assets/:assetId/thumbnail', authFromQuery, async (req: Request, res
router.get('/assets/:assetId/original', authFromQuery, async (req: Request, res: Response) => {
const authReq = req as AuthRequest;
const { assetId } = req.params;
const { userId } = req.query;
if (!isValidAssetId(assetId)) return res.status(400).send('Invalid asset ID');
const targetUserId = userId ? Number(userId) : authReq.user.id;
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(targetUserId) as any;
// Only allow accessing own Immich credentials — prevent leaking other users' API keys
const user = db.prepare('SELECT immich_url, immich_api_key FROM users WHERE id = ?').get(authReq.user.id) as any;
if (!user?.immich_url || !user?.immich_api_key) return res.status(404).send('Not found');
try {